Criminal Organizations and Safety in Latin America

In December 2024, the Alliance for Security, Justice, and Development was launched, an initiative spearheaded by the Inter-American Development Bank and involving 18 countries from Latin America and the Caribbean. The alliance aims to protect vulnerable populations, strengthen security and justice institutions, and reduce illicit markets and financial flows, as a response to the persistent issue of organized crime in the region.

The underlying drivers of criminality, such as widespread poverty, low investment in education, and limited job opportunities, continue to persist, making the large profits from narco-trafficking and other organized crimes more enticing. These factors, combined with the political and social pressures favoring immediate security, have made it challenging to implement long-term, effective strategies.

Academic studies have raised questions about the overall effectiveness of certain strategies, particularly regarding the potential for increased police brutality. Given this, the alliance promotes evidence-based policies and implements concrete actions, avoiding a one-size-fits-all approach.

Some jurisdictions, such as Medellin in Colombia, and Ecuador during Rafael Correa's presidency from 2007 to 2017, have experimented with hybrid strategies that combine community-based prevention programs with targeted law enforcement operations. These approaches have shown some success in reducing violence and homicide rates, but they are not without challenges.

Mexico and parts of Central America will remain particularly vulnerable, with the highest murder rates in 2024 recorded on the Turks and Caicos Islands, making it one of the most murder-affected places relative to population size that year. This underscores the transnational nature of these threats in a region without a permanent collective security institution, making fighting organized crime a Sisyphean task.

Reductions in foreign assistance from President Donald Trump's administration are likely to exacerbate this trend by limiting the U.S.'s willingness and capacity to engage in security cooperation and support soldiers, police, prosecutors, and judges in Latin America. This further emphasizes the need for regional cooperation and self-reliance.

Some Latin American leaders have advocated more pragmatic approaches to dismantle the political and financial systems that sustain organized crime, reduce impunity, and address the social roots of violence. However, public support for security militarization will persist only as long as the security situation improves.

The most optimistic scenario is the least likely, requiring a regional effort to enhance governance capabilities, coordinate security responses, eliminate ungoverned areas, and ensure judicial independence to effectively investigate corruption and prosecute criminals. The most likely scenario is that organized crime and its role in corruption and violence will remain a fixture of Latin America's political, social, and economic landscape, with significant regional variations.

The alliance focuses on three main pillars: protecting vulnerable populations, strengthening security and justice institutions, and reducing illicit markets and financial flows. Even if it occurs, universal reduction in violence would reflect better management of organized crime rather than its complete eradication. The alliance's success will depend on its ability to adapt to the unique challenges faced by each member country and to maintain the support of its constituents.