Embracing Kennan's Legacy: Mastering the Art of Dominating Global Power Struggle

In the ever-evolving landscape of international relations, a series of expert commentaries has emerged, focusing on US competitive strategy and irregular warfare in the physical, cyber, and information spaces. This series, part of the Competition in Cyberspace Project (C2P), is a joint initiative by the Army Cyber Institute and the National War College's website. The series is titled "Compete and Win: Envisioning a Competitive Strategy for the Twenty-First Century."

At the helm of this discourse is Colonel Steve Heffington, a professor of national security strategy at the National War College. He has been a faculty member since 2015 and is also the coauthor of "A National Security Strategy Primer." His expertise shines in the realm of strategic analysis, guiding discussions towards a clear understanding of the complexities involved.

A key concept in strategy is the theory of success. This is not a blueprint for execution but rather a strategist's hypothesis of expected causal relationships. It serves as a strategic version of commander's intent, guiding subordinate or lateral actors and institutions. Richard P. Rumelt, an advocate for this approach, now believes the beating heart of good strategy is a clear, coherent, and well-challenged theory of success.

The development of a theory of success in strategy facilitates a deeper exploration of the proposed strategy, helping to identify risks and potential failures before they occur. It provides US intelligence agencies, the policy community, think tanks, and scholars with a defined set of targets for developing valuable intelligence requirements and conducting analysis. This, in turn, substantially decreases the chances of the United States charging boldly and unswervingly down the wrong strategic path.

The competitive strategy framework is a valuable option for developing a theory of success. It involves a net assessment of competitors, other relevant international actors, and internal, domestic conditions. This comprehensive approach allows for a robust understanding of the strategic landscape, enabling informed decision-making.

Moreover, the ability to leverage vibrant and robust governmental and civilian analysis and public debate is an asymmetric advantage of our liberal society. This advantage is best leveraged when a theory of success is clearly defined, allowing for a focused and productive dialogue.

George Kennan, frequently referenced as a preeminent post-World War II strategist practitioner, is another notable figure in this discourse. His brilliance lies in his ability to clearly diagnose problems and develop understandable and viable theories of success. Although Kennan is universally credited with the Cold War containment strategy and often with the Marshall Plan, neither strategy was fully implemented by him.

John Boyd's OODA loop is also relevant to the strategist-practitioner and policymaker, as it encourages rapid, tailored responses and iterative evolution of strategy. This iterative approach aligns with the need for a clear theory of success, allowing for adaptability in a rapidly changing strategic environment.

In conclusion, the series "Compete and Win: Envisioning a Competitive Strategy for the Twenty-First Century" provides valuable insights into the importance of a clear theory of success in strategy development. If US strategic choices are made more rapidly by lateral or subordinate elements with a clearer and more immediate view of the changing strategic context, the United States can outthink its more hierarchical, top-driven strategic competitors.