Strengthening Authoritarian Regimes in Africa Through Military Aid

In the past few decades, the United States has been a significant provider of Security Force Assistance (SFA) to various countries in sub-Saharan Africa. From 2015 to 2020, over $4.8 billion was invested in this region, with countries like Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Cameroon, Chad, South Sudan, and Niger being the largest recipients.

However, the distribution of this assistance has raised concerns. More than half of the African autocrats ethnically stack their militaries, and of the top seven sub-Saharan African recipients of US SFA, five have ethnically stacked militaries. This includes Cameroon, where the BIR, initially deployed to fight against Boko Haram, has been involved in repression against the Anglophones, often conducting operations jointly with the army and gendarmes. The BIR has been identified as a culprit in widespread human rights abuses.

The Anglophone Crisis in Cameroon erupted in 2017 due to the government repressing mass protests against increasingly harsh language policies, leading to violent separatism. This incident highlights the potential risks of investing in authoritarian regimes with questionable human rights records.

On the other hand, Ghana, Senegal, and Benin, all relatively stable democratic countries and leading voices in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), have benefited from SFA. This assistance has generally contributed to reinforcing their military professionalism and, in some cases, supported democratic consolidation by enabling better peacekeeping and internal security capabilities.

ECOWAS, an organization with an active counterterrorism agenda, has repeatedly used its collective military forces to preserve regional stability. They have been involved in traditional peacekeeping missions in countries like Sierra Leone and Liberia, and enforcing election results in Gambia. The member states of ECOWAS, particularly Ghana, Senegal, and Benin, have deep interests in stabilizing neighboring Mali and Burkina Faso but struggle with limited resources and financing.

In light of these findings, a strategy of containment, using financial and intelligence-based tools, could be a more effective approach for the United States. This strategy would aim to disrupt the ability of extremist groups to organize attacks and project power beyond the territories they control, without strengthening the coercive power of some of the continent's worst dictators.

The United States could also direct more security force assistance to the member states of ECOWAS, without any of the negative repercussions of investing in dictatorships. This would not only support the stabilization of the region but also align with the democratic values that the United States upholds.

Recent developments in some of the recipient countries have shown the potential for change. For instance, in March 2021, Niger transferred power from one democratically elected leader to another for the first time in its history and survived a failed military coup attempt. Similarly, in April 2021, Chad's President Idriss Déby died on the battlefield and was succeeded by his son in a "dynastic coup." These events underscore the need for the United States to be more selective in its local partners and resist propping up flailing authoritarian regimes.

In conclusion, while Security Force Assistance has had positive impacts in some cases, the United States should exercise caution in its partnerships in sub-Saharan Africa. It is crucial to prioritise support for democratic governments and to invest in strategies that promote stability without strengthening authoritarian regimes.